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THE SOLIPSISM OF RELIGION
BY T. B. STORK
YES : Solipsism, that word of dread, despised and set aside until
restored to its proper place, rehabilitated by the great bishop in
his Priiicihlcs of Kiioi^lcdgc. For Rishop Berkeley showed beyond
all criticism that the doctrine of Solipism was in the intellectual
world when properly qualified the only philoso])hically sound posi-
tion. The knowledge of himself and of his own internal state is all
the indubitable knowledge vouchsafed man, all else is inference, con-
jecture, more or less assured. Descartes recognized the truth of
the doctrine in his Cogifn ergo siiin that certified to a man his own
existence bv the only trustworthy evidence, his own consciousness.
Just as in the intellectual world so in the spiritual world
—
per-
haps we should say a fortiori—are we shut in upon ourselves. All
we really know is the condition of our own soul.
And is not that all we are required to know ?
A failure to recognize this truth of Solipsism and its equally im-
portant qualification is at the root of all the intellectual difficulties
of religious discussions. For Berkeley not only announced that all
we know certainy is our internal state of consciousness, but he added
the qualification that we can know nothing else with equal certainty,
the certainty demanded by philosophy. The endless and fruitless
discussions of God's dealing with men, of the inconsistencies of
nominal Christians, of the thousand and one external facts that seem
contradictory of our ethical notions of right and wrong all ignore
this great and fundamental truth. For religion is not a matter of
external happenings but of internal conditions, of the state of the
soul. It might be said to be a matter of feeling, if that word "feel-
ing" were iiot so vague and indefinite in its significance. It is this
that constitutes wiiat I have called the Solipsism of religion, the ex-
clusive suljjective nature of it which makes it so peculiarly and exclu-
sively the man's inner self that no facts, no reasoning about it is pos-
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sible. for reasoning always involves comparison, the passing of
judgment v/hich in such a case is impossible. The inner state of one
man cannot be compared or judged by the inner state of the other.
This is not to say that there is no relation between the state of the
soul and external facts. The goodness of God. his nature, his love
toward men, the existence of good and evil, the coming of Christ,
his mission and message, all these facts concern the soul but its sal-
vation is V. rought not by the bare facts but by the soul's realization
of the facts, by their reaction on the soul.
In religion, therefore, all attention is to be fixed on the condition
of the soul, and this is refractory to any rationalizing treatment. The
final test is not. do I correctly interpret God's acts, do I understand
the why and wherefore of the transactions of God and can I recon-
cile them with the ethical standard which I hold, but this and onlv
this, have I a certain inward peace with God and man. a state that
1 cannot define in intellectual terms, but only know bv experiencing
it.
Xor is this a peculiar characteristic of religion alone. It applies
to all those moods or phases of the self which for want of a better
term we call feelings, love, terror, happiness, misery, sorrow, vague
indefinite expressions for states which defy reasoning or discussion
but which we know immediately and with a reality that seems at the
time the only reality possible to us.
The attempt to describe them in words puts us to all sorts of
circumlocation. We say of the soul's state that it is reconciled with
God. that it has attained peace, happiness, that God has taken up
his abode in it.
^letaphor and symbolical language are our only refuge when
we come to deal with our feelings which are truly mysteries to our
intellectual comprehension, indescribable in any terms known to it.
They are states of the Ego. they are the Ego itself for the time of
their presence. How can such a state as Happiness or Love or
Terror be expressed in words? They are untranslatable, to know
them you m.ust be them.
This becomes very evident when we examine the effort that has
been made to express certain feelings. Such efiforts are utterly in-
adequate to convey to one who has not experienced them any notion
of what is meant. Take for example the feeling of lov, how manv
poets have dealt with it. turned it this way and that, embroidered
it with their fancies, striven to express all the reality and the joy
of it. yet how plain it is that all they succeed in doing is to deal with
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its external symptoms, kisses, caresses, beautiful thoughts of the
beloved object which are only the outward manifestations just as
virtuous actions, kind deeds are the outward manifestations of the
saved soul.
Strive we never so hard we can never break into that sacred
temple of the soul sealed to all but its indweller, the arcana of its
secrets impossible of revelation to any stranger. Shut up within
that impenetratable sanctuary the man can neither unfold its mys-
teries to another or open its gates to the entrance of his own reason.
This is a fortiori true of that mystery of mysteries, religion and
salvation.
Above all it cannot be reasoned about or told in words. It must
be experienced to be known. So the Scriptures darkly hint when
they tell us : 'Tf any man will do his will he shall know of the doc-
trine." John vii. 17. It is a matter of personal experience.
This is not to say that there are no external facts which produce
the states of the Ego, create fear, love, terror, salvation, nor that
the external facts are not like all other similar facts subject to our
reasoning faculties, cannot be examined, studied, criticized, their
truth, their relation to other facts reasoned about. But no external
facts can of themselves work these changes of condition in the soul.
It is only when they are absorbed, assimilated in some inexplicable
way that these conditions of love, terror, of salvation are created.
If it be conceded, as indeed it must, that salvation is a matter
of the soul's condition indescribable but very real producing a hap-
piness, a peace that many testify is utterly beyond words and if the
external facts simply hold a relation to that state by reason of their
assimilation in some inexplicable way so that they are made part of
the soul by faith and belief it might be possible to put a hypothetical
question very difficult to answer. Suppose this state of the soul to
be established, a state established through belief, realization of cer-
tain external facts, and suppose again that it appeared these facts
had no existence outside of the soul what if any would be the effect
on that state of the soul : would that happiness, that peace and con-
tent previously established be destroyed by something entirely out-
side the soul and its beliefs and faith? Or would not the cry of Job
uttered with a sublime ignoring of all external facts be the answer?
"Though He slay me yet will I trust in Him." Job xiii. 15.
That state of soul once established is impervious to the assaults
of external facts. It has become independent, taken up to a higher
plane of faith and belief beyond and superior to all facts.
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It may be said that this is a species of Agnosticism. On the con-
trary it is only drawing a sharp hne of demarcation between what
we know and what we are forbidden to know. It is by overstepping
that Hne that all our difficulties regarding religion arise, our doubts
about miracles, our questioning of God's government of the world,
his failure to punish the wicked, his permitting all the evil which we
see in the world and which conceding his omnipotence can only exist
bv his sufferance.
Onc^ recognize the limitations of our intellectual powers and of
our ethical perceptions and all these difficulties disappear. Clever
thinkers studying the Universe and God's government thereof as-
sume that whatever they behold must measure up to their under-
standing of it. that a world incomprehensible to their understanding
is an impossible world. To exist reasonably it must be capable of
an explanation to an intelligence like theirs, or as an able expositor
Lord Chalmwood has put it, it ouglit at least to be "explained to
a gentleman like me."
This is of course to assume first that we understand intellec-
tually the transactions we contemplate and secondly that our ethical
sense is adequate to pass a competent ethical judgment on them
when understood. We must understand God's ultimate aims and
purposes and we must be endowed with a knowlege of ethical prin-
ciples applicable to his acts. It is not agnostic to say that our knowl-
edge is strictly limited, our minds incapable of thinking bevond our
practical needs.
In like manner on its ethical side our minds are not endowed
with a knowledge of ethical principles except such as are adapted
to our practical requirements, guides for our conduct toward God
and our fellow man, but which onlv bewilder us when taxed be-
yond these requirements. Our ethical shortcomings parallel our
intellectual shortcomings. A brief review of our intellectual limita-
tions which in many ways seem to parallel our ethical limitations
may enable us to see this more clearlv. It was Kant who for all
time defined in his Critique of Pure Reason these limitations, ex-
pounding the solipsism of the reason in all its strength and weak-
ness : for he was the first to explain the certaintv and the reason
for the certainty of synthetic judgments a priori so that zvifhout
empirical knowledge without and before experience we "were per-
fectly sure of certain indubitable truths such for example as that a
straight line is the shortest distance between two points. At the
same time he showed the superior quality of such truth over truth
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derived by induccion from experience. Going a step further he
gave distinct warning in his antinomies of the imbeciUties of our
thinking, our inabiHty either to think a first Cause or a world be-
ginning without a Cause, our inabihty to think God as free or as
determined, etc., etc. These were Kant's important gifts to Philos-
ophy.
As a further hint regarding our intellectual limitations there
might be suggested the difificulty of thinking the fourth dimension of
space—if there be such a thing—the relativity theory of Einstein,
the possibility adverted to by John Stuart Mill of thinking twice
two made five. We are given the power to know and to think neces-
sary and appropriate for our work in the world. We have a prac-
tical intellect fitted to enable us to do what lies before us. but when
we would apply it to spiritual matters to the soul of man to the
Universe of God and his ways we find ourselves launching out upon
an unknown sea without chart or compass. We are lost and bewil-
dered for our minds are unequal to the adventure. We see before
us looming large and threatening the "No trespass" sign which
Kant erected when he laid down his Antinomies. .Applying the
same course of reasoning to the corresponding ethical sense we can
readily see how It, too, is limited to the necessities of our life ; in-
deed even for these it sometimes proves inadequate. We need not
go to the volumes of Mediaeval Casuistry with their multitude of
doubtful cases, Angelus. Pacificus, Amortis's Dictionary of Cases
of Conscience, etc. One very common and often cited question will
suffice. Reference is made to the problem whether it is ethically
right in some circumstances to tell a lie, when for example an in-
tending murderer or robber asks the road his prospective victim
took. Is a he thea permissible? Or suppose an ill patient to whom
the truth would be fatal, shall the physician speak it or lie?
Tf he cannot formulate an opinion in such a case with an assur-
ance of its ethical Tightness that will gain the assent of all or even
a majority of mankind, how can we pass an ethical opinion upon
God's government of a Universe so vast that it takes light thou-
sands of years to travel from one end to the other? Only the other
day a prohibition advocate presumably a good conscientious man
admitted and justified his use of bribery and lies to further the
cause of prohibition. If our ethical sense is so uncertain, so inade-
quate to a clear cut positive decision in such comparatively simple
cases, is it not rank presumption for our "intellectuals" to think it
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adequate for these deeper more complex qnestions that concern God
and His Universe?
Suppose bv wav of experiment we make the actual trial of apply-
ing our human rules of ethics to God's conduct, not in a broad dis-
cursive way. but with some of the specific rules that are ours, say
the ten commandments, those most concise rules of human conduct.
Could anything- be more fantastic and absurd than to cite the rule
against stealing or covetousness or killing as applying to the
Almighty power that has made and owns all things? Tf then it is
inapplicable very obviously in this detailed way. is it not fair to pre-
sume that our attempt to apply our ethical rules to God's conduct
in larger matters is e(Hiallv inappro]iriatc. TT(^w can we pronotmce
God unjust or cruel because according to our ideas of the world He
might make a world free from suffering, exempt from sin with all
men happv. all living creatures dwelling in peace and harmony witli
each other. Such a judgment assumes two things: first, that we
fully understand intellectually the pro1)lem we study : secondly that
our human ethical sense is adequate to it.
Tf intellectually we are limited in our thinking bv natural inabil-
itv is it to be wondered at that ethicallv we arc even more limited
that just as our minds are not gifted with the power to think God
and his Universe in all its completeness, so our souls are not en-
dowed with ethical sense to measure and judge God's government
of the world.
For centuries men have struggled with this difftcultv. from the
time in fact when first men began to think, thev were having these
perplexing thoughts, were asking why God did not punish the
wicked, whv He permitted the righteous to suffer, whv in His
Almiorhtv power He d'd not banish sin. create a perfectly happy
world without pain or suffering, in fine whv He did not comply in
all his acts with the reriuirements of that ethical sense with which
man was endowed. The inspired writings are filled with complaints
of the inability of man to understand God's wavs. His dealings with
man. The great book of fob has this for its theme expressed in
that exclamation: "Canst thou bv searching find out God?" Job xi.
7. After its long discussion it leaves the tremendous question un-
answered and unanswerable. .St. Paul has added his testimonv:
"How unsearchable are His iudgments and TTis ways past finding
out." Romans xi. 3.t. and the great author of Tsaiah : "For my
thoughts are not vour tlioughts ... so are mv ways higher than
vour wavs and mv thoughts than vour thoughts." Tsaiah Iv. 8-9.
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Antinomies which might run somewhat in this wise:
Perhaps some Kant of the future may formulate the Ethical
TJicsis
God is merciful ; not willing that any should perish. He gave
His son to save men.
Antithesis
God is just: out of Christ a consuming fire. He has created and
maintains a world full of sin and misery.
Are we then to suppose that all the rules of our thinking, of our
ethics are simply makeshifts, true for us but possessing no eternal
universal truth? We cannot answer this question ; but we know that
God and the world exist although we cannot think intelligently how
they came to exist, and that therefore there must be some intelligible
account of how they exist or came to exist and so of the rules of
ethics Ave are obliged to suppose that there is a satisfactory principle
which, if we could comprehend it, would fully explain all the con-
tradictions which distress us by reason of our limited apprehension
of ethical principles when we contemplate God's dealing with the
world.
There may be and probably there is a rnivcrsal Com])lete law
of ethics and of thought of which our knowledge is only a part, a
partial limited knowledge restricted to the practical requirements
of our life here.
Just as our intellect cannot construe the Universe, cannot think it
as either eternal or as having a beginning in time, cannot think of
a first Cause or the absence of one and yet we feel that somewhere
there is a higher intelligence than ours that reconciles all these con-
tradictions that does think these truly and clearly so there must
be some moral sense higher than ours that construes the right and
wrong of the Universe without contradiction.
The foregoing considerations lead us not to a blank agnosticism
but to certain positive and as it seems to me valuable conclusions
exhibiting not only what we do not and cannot in the nature of
things expect to know, but what we do know and the high assur-
ace with which we do know what we know. We know our salva-
tion by that mysterious knowledge \ouchsafed to a man in his own
soul incommunicable to others, unspeakable but sure beyond all pos-
sibility of doubt as no other knowledge is sure. Tt is an immediate
^
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consciousness that surpasses all other certainties so that to doubt it
is to doubt one's own existence.
It is a matter of immediate apprehension rec[uiring no proof,
no reasoning to estabhsh itself, impossible of doubt, impervious to
reason, superior in quality to all other degrees of knowledge, stand-
ing on the same plane as Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum. Expressed
in the language of Scripture it tells us that each man has the proof
within himself. "He that believeth in the Son of God hath the wit-
ness in himself." I John v. 10. Or as elsewhere: The Kingdom of
God is within you.
This is not to say that a man saves himself any more than it says
that he is saved by some external mechanical operation that plucks
him in spite of himself to safety and salvation. Neither of them is a
true statement by itself any more than that a man thinks by him-
self. To think there must be the external stimulus without which
there would be no thinking. The external stimulus does not create
thinking, hut it is the occasion of it. So with the coming of salva-
tion to the soul, there must be the external impulse to be followed
by the spiritual reaction, the transformation, which is sometimes
called Conversion. This is a Divine work, dependent upon the man
in one sense, yet independent of him in another. But the evidence
of it, the assurance is only for the man's own private individual
soul. Xo one has this knowledge but himself. He has this assur-
ance within himself and if the question be asked: ^Tav he not be
mistaken, be deceiving himself?^ we find ourselves confronted with
that impassable barrier, our intellectual impotence. We cannot in-
quire into this any more than we can inquire into the validitv of
our thinking. \Ye must accept both as given, just as we are com-
pelled to think twice two make four. AA'e cannot question the truth
of it or consider the possibility whether under different laws of
thought twice two might make five as John Stuart Mill suggests.
We are thus led to the positive conclusion that we have no means
of knowing, still less of passing judgment on the spiritual conditions
of others. Our business is with our own souls and for that we have
ample power, but beyond that we are unable and have no occasion
to go.
We are also made aware of the absurdity— to give it no harsher
name—of men undertaking to conceive God intellectually or to
apply ethical measure to his acts. We behold the spectacle of cer-
tain "intellectuals" suffering keen spiritual distress because God
permits wars, because so many cruel and wicked deeds in their
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judgment are perpetually occurring in Ciod's world so that their
moral sense is shocked and their faith and belief in God's love and
goodness Is shaken. How can they believe in a God who does oy
suffers such things to be done. Are men therefore never to use their
reasoning powers with respect to God and his world? Far from it.
it is not with too much reasoning but with too little that the fault lies.
If the "intellectuals" would vigorously press their reasoning to its
legitimate conclusions no difficulty would arise, for then it would be
evident what the limits of their reasoning powers were and it would
appear that all their distress was due not to their reasoning Init to
their lack of reasoning.
Thus Solipsism is the answer to that subtle propaganda against
religion which is so much in evidence just now. a propaganda deli-
catelv suggested in novels and essays portraying the weakness and
absurdity o^ many Christians, their inconsistencies, their hypocrisies,
their subtle combination of God and Mammon. All these are no con-
cern of the individual soul. It is not called upon to justify or con-
demn or to pass any judgment on them, nor is it affected by the
truth or falsity of the accusations. Wholly independent, separate,
each soul to its own Master standeth or falleth.
